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The United States has many banks that are small relative to large corporations and play a limited role in corporate governance, and a well developed stock market with an associated market for corporate control.
In contrast, Japanese and German banks are fewer in number but larger in relative size and are said to play a central governance role. Neither country has an active market for corporate control.
We extend the debate on the relative efficiency of bank- and stock market-centered capital markets by developing a further systematic difference between the two systems: Understanding the link between the stock market and the venture capital market requires understanding the contractual arrangements between entrepreneurs and venture capital providers; especially, the importance of the opportunity to enter into an implicit contract over control, which gives a successful entrepreneur the option to reacquire control from the venture capitalist by using an initial public offering as the means by which the venture capitalist exits from a portfolio investment.
We also extend the literature on venture what causes swings in the stock market contracting by offering an explanation for two central characteristics of the U.
EconPapers: Ownership structure and stock market liquidity: evidence from Tunisia
The authors are grateful for helpful suggestions from the editor and an anonymous referee, and from Anant Admati, Erik Berglof, Stephen Choi, Kevin Davis, Uri 2016 email addresses of stock brokers in kuwait, Victor Goldberg, Paul Gompers, Joseph Grundfest, Ehud Kamar, Michael Klausner, Joshua Lerner, Ronald Mann, Paul Pfleiderer, Mark Ramsayer, Charles Sabel, Allen Schwartz, and Omri Yadlin, and from participants in workshops at Columbia Law School, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, the Max Planck Institute Hamburg, Germanyand the American Law and Economics Association.
Research support was provided by Columbia Law School and the Roberts Program in Law and Business, Stanford Law School. We thank Laura Menninger, Nishani Naidoo, Annette Schuller, and Ram Vasudevan for research assistance.
Ownership Structure and Stock Market Liquidity in France - Ajina Aymen
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Journal of Financial Economics Volume 47, Issue 315 MarchPages Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: Author links open the author workspace.
Ownership Structure and Stock Market Liquidity
Opens the author workspace a. Numbers and letters correspond to the affiliation list.
Click to expose these in author workspace Ronald J Gilson. Click to expose these in author workspace b.
Ownership Structure and Stock Market Liquidity by Atulya Sarin, Karen Shastri, Kuldeep Shastri :: SSRN
Click to expose these in author workspace a Columbia University School of Law, New York, NYUSA b Stanford University School of Law, Stanford, CaliforniaUSA. Abstract The United States has many banks that are small relative to large corporations and play a limited role in corporate governance, and a well developed stock market with an associated market for corporate control.Prof. Richard Wolff - Be Very Very Careful About the Stock Market…Here’s Why
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